Category: evolution

Civilization, Erasure, and Immaculate Conceptions

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Jeff Koons’ Venus figure from Barcelona’s MOCO Museum. You can see me with my phone trapped in her belly.

There is a persistent fear of societal erasure that permeates contemporary social and cultural criticism. South Korea, Taiwan, Italy, and Eastern Europe all have very low birthrates and face the reality of drastic change or erasure in the next fifty or so years. Even the leaden National Security Strategy (NSS) document of the Trump administration outright proclaims there is a “stark prospect of civilizational erasure” in Europe due to low birthrates and immigration. In the United States there is worry over young people not being interested in sex, and birthrates, while not as low as in other countries, have not been at replacement rate for more than a decade. Among working-class whites in America, young women often just find their male counterparts not good husband or father material. The same is true of college-educated women, who increasingly outnumber their slacker male counterparts

Some commentators reflect that what is needed is a religious revival that somehow reverses the liberation of women and gets them back to raising children in a celebration of God’s aims. Less dreamy policy ideas include paying couples for children and eliminating the economic barriers to working women who have children.

There is, of course, an inherent racism built into some of these fears; the thought is that American or Japan or Italy are losing something important if waves of immigrants gradually come to dominate the civilizations. The decline and fall of Western civilization is driven not by the LA punk scene but by this nebulous replacement idea driven by some kind of global elite (often with antisemitic overtones).… Read the rest

Functional Information Analysis and the Chinese Room

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I’ve been considering the implications of a new scientific law, the law of increasing functional information, in terms of how it can be applied to our thinking about various ideas. At first glance, the law says little new about the physical world. We already know about much of the various levels of the functions that are described in the paper, from star formation up through the evolution of human behavior. But there may be another way of thinking about it. A quote from Margaret Bowdon on Searle’s famous Chinese Room Argument shows how it might help:

The inherent procedural consequences of any computer program give it a toehold in semantics, where the semantics in question is not denotational, but causal.

So here we have an attack on the underlying assumption that what human understanding amounts to involves semantics and meaning that a robot or computational procedure can never have. If we expand Bowdon’s claim about how meaning comes about to include some of Searle’s other quotes like the room can never know what a hamburger is in Chinese just by processing the relevant symbols, we can enlarge that toehold by including all the functional engagements that are part of the experience of coexisting with and consuming hamburgers in a Chinese-language environment.

Semantics and intentionality and meaning—all these folk concepts we use to express how we are aware and conscious—collapse into function with the impetus driven by this new law. Meaning is an inherent feature of function, we just mystify it a great deal. In fact, a part of the semantics associated with the Chinese Room is embedded in the transfer rules that are used for translation. Whoever developed those rules understood Chinese well-enough to code them up accurately and that represents functional information increase.… Read the rest

After Z

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The nights and days collide with violence. There is the nocturnal me and the dazed, daylight version squinting away from the glaring windows. There are the catnaps that lace with riotous algebras. I am addicted to caffeine, or run on it, until even it becomes unpersuasive, and I droop over at the keyboard. Then this pulse of creation pulls me out again, stunned for a few beats, and I grasp my mug and stumble back to the lab floor.

Z keeps changing, day by day, midnights into dawns, and reawakening in clanging novelty. Z is for “zombie,” for it is in the uncanny valley of both a physical and cogitating thing. It perceives, stands, jogs in place beside me on the laboratory floor, an ochre braid of wires bouncing in a dreadlock mass behind it. Z plays chess, folds towels (how hard that was!), argues politics (how insane is that one!), and constantly restructures nuances in its faces and gestures. Sometimes I’m tired and Z is an impertinent teenager. Often there are substitutions and semantic scrambling like a foreigner who mistakes a word for another, then carries on in a fugue of incoherence.

There is a half-acre of supercooled GPUs to the north of the lab where the hot churn of work is happening. It’s a spread of parallel dreamscapes, each funneled the new daily stimuli, stacking them into a training pool, then rerunning the simulations, splitting and recombining, then trying again to minimize the incoherency, the errors, and the size of the model. Of the ten thousand fermenting together, one becomes the new Z for a few hours, but then is gone again by morning, replaced by a child of sorts that harbors the successes but sheds the excesses and broken motifs.… Read the rest

All Hail Evolved Irrationality

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From an impersonal distance, watching other people make decisions is always interesting. They may apply reason and passion in varied measures to figure out a way forward, or a lifestyle, or even fashion choices. Often they mindfully weigh the choices and decide to moderate even that process, committing to a radical path that has drama and uncertainty. It’s sometimes better to be interesting than cautious and correct. As a virtue this recalls the romantic movements that arose in opposition to the mechanization of the 19th century as trains and steamships criss-crossed the world. Order and peace were at odds with drama, passion, faith, and love that are somehow in our core, animalistic nature.

Motifs of uncertainty crept into science and reason as we transitioned into the 20th century, from the stochastic rumble of thermodynamics, to the realigning of basic concepts like gravity as a space-time curvature, and then the wave-particle duality of quantum reality. The clockwork of the universe that was so oppressively mechanistic showed fuzzy edges and knotty intersections that defied ordinary-scale expectations. The combined mathematical realizations of incompleteness and algorithmic uncomputability overlaid the investigations of the physical to such an extent that new theories were developed that proposed that the quantum world and mind are inextricably laced together; subjective and objective do not exist independently.

Even as our knowledge and management of the universe has grown, there is a background roil of irrationality, like the primal chaos of Tiamat. Human thought has a collection of ways of organizing the world that appear to be natural consequences of our social development. Religious belief is a widespread catalyst for building predictable and supportive communities by slaving our baser tendencies to coordinating strictures, obligations, and status maintenance.… Read the rest

Searching for Emergence

Mark Davis1 Comment

I have a longstanding interest in the concept of emergence as a way of explaining a wide range of human ideas and the natural world. We have this incredible algorithm of evolutionary change that creates novel life forms. We have, according to mainstream materialist accounts of philosophy of mind, a consciousness that may have a unique ontology (what really exists) of subjective experiencers and qualia and intentionality, but that is also somehow emergent from the meat of the brain (or supervenes or is an epiphenomenon, etc. etc.) That emergence may be weak or strong in various accounts, with strong meaning something like the idea that a new thing is added to the ontology while weak meaning something like we just don’t know enough yet to find the reduction of the concept to its underlying causal components. If we did, then it is not really something new in this grammar of ontological necessity.

There is also the problem of computational irreducibility (CI) that has been championed by Wolfram. In CI, there are classes of computations that result in outcomes that cannot be predicted by any simpler algorithm. This seems to open the door to a strong concept of emergence: we have to run the machine to get the outcome; there is no possibility (in theory!) of reducing the outcome to any lesser approximation. I’ve brought this up as a defeater of the Simulation Hypothesis, suggesting that the complexity of a simulation is irreducible from the universe as we see it (assuming perfect coherence in the limit).

There is also a dual to this idea in algorithmic information theory (AIT) that is worth exploring. In AIT, it is uncomputable to find the shortest Turing Machine capable of accepting a given symbol sequence.… Read the rest

Incredulity as a Moral Failure

Mark Davis4 Comments

I keep encountering arguments from incredulity in the speculative religious community. An argument from incredulity is just an assertion by the arguer that they can’t imagine how something is possible. In two recent examples, the arguers are the Christian faithful and are trying to deconstruct materialist counterarguments to their speculations about collections of facts. I think this is both an intellectual and a moral failure. It is an intellectual failure when the speculators don’t choose the obvious stance with regard to unknowns and unknowables: I don’t know. It is a moral failure when the consequences of such intellectual failures leads to weakly-justifiable faith constructs that harm or might harm others.

Let’s take a couple of examples. First, we have Ross Douthat (I know, I know, I spend too much time on him, but he does have a big platform being at New York Times). He has a forthcoming book about why one should believe in a religion, although he is not forceful about which particular one is the right choice for any individual, it seems. But here is a recent set of three arguments from that book. They all rely on incredulity in some way.

  1. The fine tuning argument. Ross thinks it is highly improbable that some physical constants in our universe happened by chance. He also thinks that one materialist solution to that happenstance is to speculate about multiverses. In the multiverse solution, there are many universes (maybe a cosmic foam with little universe bubbles!) and ours just happened to be goldilocksish for the structure we observe. Of course, we can speculate all day about this. We can instead say perhaps we have been having infinite Big Bangs as a single universe expands then collapses.
… Read the rest

Deep Zombies

Mark Davis1 Comment

There is a slang nominal form of the word “deepening” for when a person seems to be purposefully adding awe, mystery, and unknowns to their arguments: deepenings. It often arises in discourse on religion and mystical experiences. As a child in the 70s we had Bigfoot, Nessy, the Bermuda Triangle, UFOs, near-death experiences, and the strange stuff from Velikovsky, von Däniken, and Sitchin. The books and movies built deepenings into communities and businesses just as surely as Catholicism, Mormonism, or Scientology have done. There is a human desire for mystery. But it doesn’t make the mysteries true. But many religious folks hold on to thin threads that point towards mystery as an added data point for justifying their faiths as real, true, valuable, and beautiful.

Given this, I was curious about David Bentley Hart’s All Things are Gods: The Mysteries of Mind and Life after Ross Douthat praised it at New York Times. It’s a big book and I’ve just skimmed around a fair bit so far, but there is a repetition of an error (among the extensive repetitions in the volume) concerning the mind-body problem that is also related to arguments from Alvin Plantinga concerning evolution. Specifically, the notion of philosophical zombies is largely irrelevant I think to claiming that subjective experience (“what it’s like…”) is non-material or of a distinct nature from the brain and the nervous system. Given what we know about evolutionary development, I don’t think that we can even conceive of a p-zombie in the way it was originally proposed.

We might try to imagine an evolutionary development of homo sapiens that does not include this subjective experience, but that would not lead to an identical human sans the qualia-experiencer because the developmental trajectory would have to be different, resulting in differing brains.… Read the rest

Rise, Teleonomatons!

Mark Davis2 Comments

My essay for the Berggruen Prize this year. Of course, the organization missed an opportunity to drop down a staggering rabbit hole and lean into a whole new regime of neologistic energetics, but I do like the prize-winning essays!

Rise, Teleonomatons

Meaning entanglements

I can’t figure out what some statements about science mean, though I have a fair background in a range of scientific areas. Now, I can peruse highly technical papers, browse abstracts, interpret graphs, study conclusions, and typically do just fine. The professional stuff is a procession of arid facts and assumes the reader knows the basic definitions for things. It’s the popular versions of scientific insights that befuddle me—especially the definitions that try mightily to bridge meanings for learners. So do introductory texts. Light is a wave? Not exactly. Atoms are particles? Well, not quite, but they are small. Electrons orbit the nucleus? No, really, no. A force is an influence tending to change the motion of a body? OK, but what is an influence? People are influenced, aren’t they? Or under the influence.

And then there are texts like those of existential philosophers that leave me completely befuddled. What is this “Being” that they write about and how did it get so enlarged in significance, capitalized, and shoehorned by the translator into incomprehensible juxtapositions with other bulbous words?

It may be low pedantry to expect clarity from words and writing. We generally just roll with it and use the terms according to conventions inferred from reading and learning. We rush over the imperfect metaphorical bridges, the analogies, the similes. For physics, definitions are bound to the equations and measurement properties that accompany the words of description, and they become a semantic pier that is constantly informing our relationship with the ideas.… Read the rest

Causally Emergent vs. Divine Spark Murder Otherwises

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One might claim that a metaphysical commitment to strong determinism is only porous to quantum indeterminacy or atomic indeterminacy (decay behavior for instance). Those two can be lumped together and simply called subatomic indeterminacy or something. Everything else is conceptually derivative of state evolution and therefore deterministic. So does that mean that my model for R fails unless I can invoke these two candidates? My suggestion of amplifying thermodynamic noise doesn’t really cut the mustard (an amusing semantic drift from pass muster, perhaps) because it only appears random and solely characterizable by these macroscopic variables like pressure and temperature, not because it actually is random in the molecule swirl.

But I can substitute an atomic decay counter for my thermodynamic amplifier, or use a quantum random number generator based on laser measurements of vacuum fluctuations. There, I’ve righted the ship, though I’ve jettisoned my previous claim that randomness is not necessary for R’s otherwises. Now it is, but it is not sufficient because of the need for a device like the generative subsystem that uses randomness in a non-arbitrary way to revise decisions. We do encounter a difficulty in porting subatomic indeterminacy into a human analog, of course, though some have given it a try.

But there is some new mathematics for causal emergence that fits well with my model. In causal emergence, ideas like necessity and sufficiency for causal explanations can be shown to have properties in macroscale explanations that are not present at microscales. The model used is a simple Markov chain that flips between two states and information theory is applied to examine a range of conceptual structures for causation running from David Hume’s train of repeating objects (when one damn thing comes after another and then again and again, we may have a cause), up through David Lewis’s notion of counterfactuals in alternative probabilistic universes (could it have happened that way in all possible worlds?),… Read the rest