An Ancient Mind Plague

In addition to Cormac McCarthy, Milan Kundera died this summer after a remarkable run of 94 years. I first read The Unbearable Lightness of Being in the early 90s and loved the strange detachment of the narrator and small moments like the critique of muzak in restaurant settings (I am now much more critical of restaurants that poorly manage sound reflections; how am I to enjoy my company in a cacophony?) But I had little use for his central philosophical pretense concerning eternal return or the use of metaphors as placeholders for people, though I have known people who strain to operate that way. Structuring a narrative around flimsy Continental ideas from Nietzsche, in turn influenced by Hinduism, Buddhism, and even Pythagoras, was too conspicuously self-absorbed with an intellectual airiness. It’s easy to achieve pretension but quite another thing to convey lofty thoughts effortlessly. I might have accepted a narrator musing on the topic among many others, playing with it while laughing at his own ridiculousness, and concluding that such concepts were mythological at best.

But there is a certain circularity in that otherwise educated people continue to latch onto narratives and metaphors that are appealing and unexpectedly strange, from little dioramas about the motives of people in our lives to grand conspiracies and mythologies filled with resurrections, demons, and eschatologies. The conspiracy narratives are a special contemporary problem accelerated by modern communications technologies, but there is nothing particularly new about them in thrust, focus, or pervasiveness.

Aluminum cans cause Alzheimer’s disease? Procter and Gamble’s logo was satanic? When I was in the Peace Corps in Fiji, the Hindu kids thought that certain toothpastes from Australia were adulterated with cow fat or something to undermine Hinduism.… Read the rest

Sentience is Physical, Part 2

Having recently moved to downtown Portland within spitting distance of Powell’s Books, I had to wander through the bookstore despite my preference for digital books these days. Digital books are easily transported, can be instantly purchased, and can be effortlessly carried in bulk. More, apps like Kindle Reader synchronize across platforms allowing me to read wherever and whenever I want without interruption. But is there a discovery feature to the shopping experience that is missing in the digital universe? I had to find out and hit the poetry and Western Philosophy sections at Powell’s as an experiment. And I did end up with new discoveries that I took home in physical form (I see it as rude to shop brick-and-mortar and then order via Amazon/Kindle), including a Borges poetry compilation and an unexpected little volume, The Body in the Mind, from 1987 by the then-head of University of Oregon’s philosophy department, Mark Johnson.

A physical book seemed apropos of the topic of the second book that focuses on the role of our physical bodies and experiences as central to the construction of meaning. Did our physical evolution and the associated requirements for survival also translate into a shaping of how our minds work? Psychologists and biologists would be surprised that there is any puzzlement over this likelihood, but Johnson is working against the backdrop of analytical philosophy that puts propositional structure as the backbone of linguistic productions and the reasoning that drives them. Mind is disconnected from body in this tradition, and subjects like metaphors are often considered “noncognitive,” which is the negation of something like “reasoned through propositional logic.”

But how do we convert these varied metaphorical concepts derived from physicality into something structured that we can reason about using effective procedures?… Read the rest

Intelligent Borrowing

There has been a continuous bleed of biological, philosophical, linguistic, and psychological concepts into computer science since the 1950s. Artificial neural networks were inspired by real ones. Simulated evolution was designed around metaphorical patterns of natural evolution. Philosophical, linguistic, and psychological ideas transferred as knowledge representation and grammars, both natural and formal.

Since computer science is a uniquely synthetic kind of science and not quite a natural one, borrowing and applying metaphors seems to be part of the normal mode of advancement in this field. There is a purely mathematical component to the field in the fundamental questions around classes of algorithms and what is computable, but there are also highly synthetic issues that arise from architectures that are contingent on physical realizations. Finally, the application to simulating intelligent behavior relies largely on three separate modes of operation:

  1. Hypothesize about how intelligent beings perform such tasks
  2. Import metaphors based on those hypotheses
  3. Given initial success, use considerations of statistical features and their mappings to improve on the imported metaphors (and, rarely, improve with additional biological insights)

So, for instance, we import a simplified model of neural networks as connected sets of weights representing some kind of variable activation or inhibition potentials combined with sudden synaptic firing. Abstractly we already have an interesting kind of transfer function that takes a set of input variables and has a nonlinear mapping to the output variables. It’s interesting because being nonlinear means it can potentially compute very difficult relationships between the input and output.

But we see limitations, immediately, and these are observed in the history of the field. For instance, if you just have a single layer of these simulated neurons, the system isn’t fundamentally complex enough to compute any complex functions, so we add a few layers and then more and more.… Read the rest

The Pregnant Machinery of Metaphor

Sylvia Plath has some thoughts about pregnancy in “Metaphors”:

I’m a riddle in nine syllables,
An elephant, a ponderous house,
A melon strolling on two tendrils.
O red fruit, ivory, fine timbers!
This loaf’s big with its yeasty rising.
Money’s new-minted in this fat purse.
I’m a means, a stage, a cow in calf.
I’ve eaten a bag of green apples,
Boarded the train there’s no getting off.

It seems, at first blush, that metaphors have some creative substitutive similarity to the concept they are replacing. We can imagine Plath laboring over this child in nine lines, fitting the pieces together, cutting out syllables like dangling umbilicals, finding each part in a bulging conception, until it was finally born, alive and kicking.

OK, sorry, I’ve gone too far, fallen over a cliff, tumbled down through a ravine, dropped into the foaming sea, where I now bob, like your uncle. Stop that!

Let’s assume that much human creativity occurs through a process of metaphor or analogy making. This certainly seems to be the case in aspects of physics when dealing with difficult to understand new realms of micro- and macroscopic phenomena, as I’ve noted here. Some creative fields claim a similar basis for their work, with poetry being explicit about the hidden or secret meaning of poems. Moreover, I will also suppose that a similar system operates in terms of creating networks of semantics by which we understand the meaning of words and their relationships to phenomena external to us, as well as our own ideas. In other words, semantics are a creative puzzle for us.

What do we know about this system and how can we create abstract machines that implement aspects of it?… Read the rest

Bullshit, Metaphors, and Political Precision

Given this natural condition of uncertainty in the meaning of words, and their critical role in communication, to say the least, we can certainly expect that as we move away from the sciences towards other areas of human endeavor we have even greater vagueness in trying to express complex ideas. Politics is an easy example. America’s current American president is a babbling bullshitter, to use the explanatory framework of the essay, On Bullshit, and he is easy to characterize as an idiot, like when he conflates Western liberalism with something going on exclusively in modern California.

In this particular case, we have to track down what “liberal” means and meant at various times, then try to suss out how that meaning is working today. At one time, the term was simply expressive of freedom with minimal government interference. Libertarians still carry a version of that meaning forward, but liberalism also came to mean something akin to a political focus on government spending to right perceived economic and social disparities (to achieve “freedom from want and despair,” via FDR). And then it began to be used as a pejorative related to that same focus.

As linguist John McWhorter points out, abstract ideas—and perhaps especially political ones—are so freighted with their pragmatic and historical background that the best we can say is that we are actively working out what a given term means. McWhorter suggests that older terms like “socialist” are impossible to put to work effectively; a newer term like “progressive” is more desirable because it carries less baggage.

An even stronger case is made by George Lakoff where he claims central metaphors that look something like Freudian abstractions govern political perspectives.… Read the rest