Tag: artificial neural networks

Sentience is Physical, Part 2

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Having recently moved to downtown Portland within spitting distance of Powell’s Books, I had to wander through the bookstore despite my preference for digital books these days. Digital books are easily transported, can be instantly purchased, and can be effortlessly carried in bulk. More, apps like Kindle Reader synchronize across platforms allowing me to read wherever and whenever I want without interruption. But is there a discovery feature to the shopping experience that is missing in the digital universe? I had to find out and hit the poetry and Western Philosophy sections at Powell’s as an experiment. And I did end up with new discoveries that I took home in physical form (I see it as rude to shop brick-and-mortar and then order via Amazon/Kindle), including a Borges poetry compilation and an unexpected little volume, The Body in the Mind, from 1987 by the then-head of University of Oregon’s philosophy department, Mark Johnson.

A physical book seemed apropos of the topic of the second book that focuses on the role of our physical bodies and experiences as central to the construction of meaning. Did our physical evolution and the associated requirements for survival also translate into a shaping of how our minds work? Psychologists and biologists would be surprised that there is any puzzlement over this likelihood, but Johnson is working against the backdrop of analytical philosophy that puts propositional structure as the backbone of linguistic productions and the reasoning that drives them. Mind is disconnected from body in this tradition, and subjects like metaphors are often considered “noncognitive,” which is the negation of something like “reasoned through propositional logic.”

But how do we convert these varied metaphorical concepts derived from physicality into something structured that we can reason about using effective procedures?… Read the rest

Triangulation Machinery, Poetry, and Politics

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I was reading Muriel Rukeyser‘s poetry and marveling at some of the lucid yet novel constructions she employs. I was trying to avoid the grueling work of comparing and contrasting Biden’s speech on the anniversary of January 6th, 2021 with the responses from various Republican defenders of Trump. Both pulled into focus the effect of semantic and pragmatic framing as part of the poetic and political processes, respectively. Sorry, Muriel, I just compared your work to the slow boil of democracy.

Reaching in interlaced gods, animals, and men.
There is no background. The figures hold their peace
In a web of movement. There is no frustration,
Every gesture is taken, everything yields connections.

There is a theory about how language works that I’ve discussed here before. In this theory, from Donald Davidson primarily, the meaning of words and phrases are tied directly to a shared interrogation of what each person is trying to convey. Imagine a child observing a dog and a parent says “dog” and is fairly consistent with that usage across several different breeds that are presented to the child. The child may overuse the word, calling a cat a dog at some point, at which point the parent corrects the child with “cat” and the child proceeds along through this interrogatory process, triangulating in on the meaning of dog versus cat. Triangulation is Davidson’s term, reflecting three parties: two people discussing a thing or idea. In the case of human children, we also know that there are some innate preferences the child will apply during the triangulation process, like preferring “whole object” semantics to atomized ones, and assuming different words mean different things even when applied to the same object: so “canine” and “dog” must refer to the same object in slightly different ways since they are differing words, and indeed they do: dog IS-A canine but not vice-versa.… Read the rest

Intelligent Borrowing

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There has been a continuous bleed of biological, philosophical, linguistic, and psychological concepts into computer science since the 1950s. Artificial neural networks were inspired by real ones. Simulated evolution was designed around metaphorical patterns of natural evolution. Philosophical, linguistic, and psychological ideas transferred as knowledge representation and grammars, both natural and formal.

Since computer science is a uniquely synthetic kind of science and not quite a natural one, borrowing and applying metaphors seems to be part of the normal mode of advancement in this field. There is a purely mathematical component to the field in the fundamental questions around classes of algorithms and what is computable, but there are also highly synthetic issues that arise from architectures that are contingent on physical realizations. Finally, the application to simulating intelligent behavior relies largely on three separate modes of operation:

  1. Hypothesize about how intelligent beings perform such tasks
  2. Import metaphors based on those hypotheses
  3. Given initial success, use considerations of statistical features and their mappings to improve on the imported metaphors (and, rarely, improve with additional biological insights)

So, for instance, we import a simplified model of neural networks as connected sets of weights representing some kind of variable activation or inhibition potentials combined with sudden synaptic firing. Abstractly we already have an interesting kind of transfer function that takes a set of input variables and has a nonlinear mapping to the output variables. It’s interesting because being nonlinear means it can potentially compute very difficult relationships between the input and output.

But we see limitations, immediately, and these are observed in the history of the field. For instance, if you just have a single layer of these simulated neurons, the system isn’t fundamentally complex enough to compute any complex functions, so we add a few layers and then more and more.… Read the rest

Ambiguously Slobbering Dogs

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I was initially dismissive of this note from Google Research on improving machine translation via Deep Learning Networks by adding in a sentence-level network. My goodness, they’ve rediscovered anaphora and co-reference resolution! Next thing they will try is some kind of network-based slot-filler ontology to carry gender metadata. But their goal was to add a framework to their existing recurrent neural network architecture that would support a weak, sentence-level resolution of translational ambiguities while still allowing the TPU/GPU accelerators they have created to function efficiently. It’s a hack, but one that potentially solves yet another corner of the translation problem and might result in a few percent further improvements in the quality of the translation.

But consider the following sentences:

The dog had the ball. It was covered with slobber.

The dog had the ball. It was thinking about lunch while it played.

In these cases, the anaphora gets resolved by semantics and the resolution seems largely an automatic and subconscious process to us as native speakers. If we had to translate these into a second language, however, we would be able to articulate that there are specific reasons for correctly assigning the “It” to the ball in the first two sentences. Well, it might be possible for the dog to be covered with slobber, but we would guess the sentence writer would intentionally avoid that ambiguity. The second set of sentences could conceivably be ambiguous if, in the broader context, the ball was some intelligent entity controlling the dog. Still, when our guesses are limited to the sentence pairs in isolation we would assign the obvious interpretations. Moreover, we can resolve giant, honking passage-level ambiguities with ease, where the author is showing off in not resolving the co-referents until obscenely late in the text.… Read the rest